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JURISDICTION 
Final judgment was entered on January 25, 2005. (R. 327). A Notice of Appeal 
was filed on February 23, 2005. (R. 335). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal on March 10, 2005 (R. 342), establishing jurisdiction in this court pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it found (1) as a factual matter that 
Silver Creek knew or should have known it incurred an injury based on High Valley 
Water Company's repudiation no later than March 28, 1994, such that, (2) as a legal 
matter, the six-year statute of limitations under section 78-12-23(2), then began to run 
and lapsed in 2000, thus barring any claim against High Valley. 
Standards of Review: As the emphasized phrases suggest, there are two issues 
and two very different standards of review. The applicability a statute of limitations is a 
legal question reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 f 32 (Utah 
2002). See also Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992)("The trial court's 
determination that the statute of limitations had expired is a question of law"). 
The "subsidiary" question, left unaddressed by Silver Creek, is when it 
"reasonably" should have known that it incurred "a legal injury" such that it could have 
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filed an action. This is a factual question, reviewed under a clear error standard. Spears, 
44P.3dat753. 
This factual question inheres in most any statute of limitations question, and at 
least when an appellant challenges the application or running of that statute. See Sevy v. 
Sec. Title Co. ofS. Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995)("the issue of when a claimant 
discovered or should have discovered the facts forming the basis of a cause of action is a 
question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be overturned on appeal unless it 
is clearly erroneous"). See also Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993). 
In cases tried to the bench, "[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." UTAH R. ClV. P. 52(a). That is so because "the findings of ultimate facts 
implicitly reflect consideration of the believability of the witnesses' testimony." 
McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Utah 1981). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-12-23(2) 
Within six years — Mesne profits of real property — Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This was an action by High Valley for declaratory judgment 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-33-1, et seq., to have declared that a 1987 Contract— 
specifically an Option for the purchase of 56 acre feet of water (the "Option")—is no 
longer enforceable. (R. 001-006). 
The Option provided that upon payment of specified sums and written notice of 
exercise, High Valley was to segregate and transfer the 56 acre feet and file a change 
application with the Utah State Engineer seeking to change the place of use of that water 
and transfer that water to Silver Creek. (R. 319 fflf 14-15). 
Nutshelled, High Valley's claim was that the Option was never properly exercised 
because only a portion of the purchase price was deposited. Alternatively, High Valley 
claimed that even if Silver Creek properly exercised, the statute of limitations and other 
defenses barred any claim for breach against High Valley. (R. 274-84). 
References to the Trial Transcript and Trial Exhibits: The trial transcript is 
paginated in the record collectively as page 346. Accordingly, citations to the transcript 
will be designated as R. 346— followed by the actual transcript page number. Trial 
exhibits are referred to as "Ex." followed by their respective numbers. The trial exhibits 
were received collectively, by stipulation, at R. 346—32. 
45805lvl 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: The action was filed on July 5, 
2001. (R. 001). High Valley's summary judgment motion was denied on July 3, 2003. 
(R. 226-235). The action was tried to the bench, and a decision rendered, on December 
8, 2004. (R. 346, passim). The trial court ruled that the Option was exercised properly as 
of December 31, 1987, (R. 320 Tf 19; R. 321 Tf 23), and that any claim against High Valley 
for breach of the Option was time-barred under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-23(2). (R. 323 
THf 37-38; 324 f^ 4). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment were 
entered on January 25, 2005. (R. 316-325, 327-328). This appeal followed. (R. 335). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
High Valley Water Company ("High Valley"), is a Utah non-profit, mutual water 
company that provides water service to its shareholders. (R. 317, | 1). High Valley is 
entitled to the use of a total of 287 acre feet of water pursuant to two contracts with 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District ("Weber Basin"). (R. 317 |^ 5). The first 
contract is for 285 acre feet and is dated February 28, 1974, contract no. 29505 ("the 
1974 Contract"). The second contract is for 2 acre feet and is dated October 18, 1977, 
contract no. 7414. Id. 
Historically, Atkinson Water Company ("AWC"), a private water company, was a 
High Valley customer and shareholder. (R. 318, % 11). Over time, certain disputes arose 
between High Valley and AWC concerning delivery to AWC's shareholders. Id. 
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As a result of these disputes, AWC accumulated debt to High Valley for water 
deliveries. On August 20, 1987, to address these disputes, High Valley, AWC, Atkinson 
Special Service District and Summit County-Atkinson Water Improvement District 
entered into an agreement (the "1987 Agreement"). (R. 319, % 12-13; Pltf. Ex. 4). 
The 1987 Agreement includes an option allowing AWC to purchase 56 acre-feet 
from High Valleys 1974 Weber Basin contract, requiring High Valley to segregate that 
amount from the 1974 Contract, (the "Option"). (R. 319,1f 14; Ex. P-4 at 6-7). 
The Option provides: 
a an initial Option price payment or deposit of $24,371.64, 
b. payments in an amount equal to 10% per year on the initial deposit, from 
July 31, 1987, to the date of closing of the purchase, and 
c. payment of any unpaid balance owed to High Valley for water service to 
AWC from August 1, 1987 to the date of closing of the purchase. 
d. Exercise of the Option required that the entire purchase price (initial deposit 
and subsequent interest and water service payments) be deposited at Silver King Bank 
(now Bank One). 
e. Upon notice of exercise and deposit of the entire Option price, High Valley 
was to file an application with the Utah State Engineer for segregation and change in the 
45805lvl 1 1 
point of diversion of 56 acre-feet, together with an assignment of that water to the owner 
of the Option. (R. 319-20, U 15; Pltf. Ex. 4 at 6-7). 
Silver Creek received the Option by assignment on December 1, 1987. (R. 320, f^ 
16). Notice of exercise of the Option was given (by AWC on behalf of Silver Creek) on 
December 31, 1987. Id. Silver Creek deposited $24,371.64 at Silver King Bank. Id. f 
18. 
Believing that the Option had not been exercised properly because additional 
money was owed for water service, High Valley did not segregate the 56 acre feet and 
did not file a change application. (R. 321, \ 29-30; Ex. P-33 at 2)(Silver Creek "does not 
yet have title and will not until it performs certain additional conditions precedent in its 
option to purchase agreement. These include the payment of additional funds . . ."). 
Silver Creek did not pay the water service portion of the option price. (R. 346—172-3, 
176). 
On June 14, 1991, High Valley filed Exchange Application E2846 "Exchange 
Application") with the Utah State Engineer. The Exchange Application was advertised 
as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-6. The State Engineer approved the Exchange 
Application in April of 1992, permitting the exchange of the entire 285 acre feet 
represented by the 1974 Contract. The purpose of the exchange was to allow High 
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Valley to interconnect its system with Atkinson Special Service District and Park Ridge 
Estates. (R. 3181(8). 
The approved Exchange Application was filed with the State Engineer pursuant to 
and in anticipation of two contracts with Atkinson Special Service District and Park 
Ridge Estates. The first of these contracts is titled "Agreement to Jointly Construct a 
Water Well, Reservoir and Water Distribution Pipelines" and is dated July 23, 1991. (Ex. 
P-24). The second contract is titled "Agreement to Jointly Use, Operate, and Maintain a 
Water Well, Reservoir, Water Distribution Pipelines and Related Facilities," also dated 
July 23, 1991. (Ex. P-25). (R. 3181 9). 
The water exchanged for this project includes the 56 acre feet. (R. 323 % 39). 
Construction under the agreements was completed, and those operations continue today. 
(R. 318 f 10). The Weber River Basin is closed to new appropriations of water, and no 
water rights can be transferred into the basin. (R. 323 ^ 40). 
During 1993 and through the fall of 1994, Silver Creek made a number of written 
and oral demands that High Valley perform under the Option by segregating the water 
and filing the change application. High Valley refused each time, believing that it had no 
obligation to perform under the Option. (R. 322, f 33; 323, f 36. See also Exs. P-14, P-
36). Silver Creek stated in 1994 that it had the basis for a "suit to establish [its] rights in 
and to the [water]" (Ex. P-16). 
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Also during those years, High Valley, believing that it owned the water, took a 
number of actions consistent with ownership, including as early as 1991 when it filed the 
exchange application (Ex. P-22), which included the 56 acre feet, and entered into 
agreements for the construction and operation of the large water system de scribed above 
and that also included the 56 acre feet. (R. 323,139; 318, If 8-9; Exs. P-24, P-25). 
High Valley is assessed a yearly charge for water under the two Weber Basin 
contracts. (Ex. P-38; R. 317 j^ 7). High Valley has paid each of its yearly assessments 
since first acquiring those contract rights in 1974 and 1977. (R. 317, fflf 5-7; 323 t 41). 
The water under the Weber Basin contracts includes the 56 acre feet. (R. 323 f 41, 317 
Ti 5-7, 323 f 39). 
During the spring and through the fall of 1994, attorneys for High Valley and 
Silver Creek exchanged a number of letters concerning the Option. The (then) attorneys 
for High Valley and Silver Creek met on approximately March 21, 1994, to discuss their 
respective positions concerning the Option. (R. 322, ^ f 33). 
This meeting occurred after the exchange of several letters in 1994 concerning 
performance of the Option. Silver Creek, through its attorney, had made previous 
demands or requests that High Valley comply with the terms of the Option, and High 
Valley, believing the Option no longer valid, consistently refused. Id. See also R. 346— 
44-46; 50-51; 55-56. 
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Silver Creek made it clear at this meeting that it was then entitled to, and 
demanded the transfer of, the 56 acre feet and the filing of the permanent change 
application. High Valley responded, making it just as clear that it had not transferred the 
water or filed the permanent change application and that it had no intention of doing so. 
(R. 322, f^ 34; see also R. 346—55-56, 57, 59). Silver Creek never filed an action against 
High Valley. (R. 323 fflj 35-38). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A statute of limitations means that time is of the essence as soon as a legal injury 
becomes actionable. This case is no exception. Silver Creek exercised the Option in 
1987. High Valley, believing that exercise defective, did not act. But neither did Silver 
Creek. 
Unchallenged on this appeal is the fact that Silver Creek knew or should have 
known it had a claim for breach no later than March, 1994. Even if High Valley's prior 
statements and conduct were insufficient, its unequivocal repudiation in March, 1994 
was. Regardless of whether the Option was executory for some period after exercise, as 
Silver Creek contends, performance was, according to Silver Creek, due at least in 1993, 
and certainly in 1994, when it "then" believed performance was due and demanded, 
repeatedly, that High Valley perform. 
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Having failed to file an action before the generous six year statute of limitations 
ran—after knowing, in other words, that High Valley had no intention of performing 
because it believed it had no obligation to perform—Silver Creek let the limitations 
period lapse, barring any action on the Option. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO 
ANY CLAIM SILVER CREEK MIGHT HAVE HAD AGAINST HIGH VALLEY. 
Statutes of limitation generally are and should be unforgiving. "Once a claim 
accrues, it may not be maintained unless it is commenced within the limitations period 
prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations." DOIT, Inc. v. louche, Ross & Co., 
926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996)(citing UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-l).1 A time-based 
limitation serves important commercial and policy functions applicable in this case: 
entirely apart from the merits of particular claims, the interest in certainty and 
finality in the administration of our affairs, especially in commercml transactions, 
makes it desirable to terminate contingent liabilities at specific points in time. It is 
this interest in finality which underlies the description of a limitations act as a 
"statute of repose." 
State of Colorado v. Western Paving Const., 833 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1987), quoting Gates 
Rubber Co. v. USMCorp., 508 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975).2 
1
 Section 78-12-1 provides that, "[c]ivil actions may be commenced only within the 
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific 
cases where a different limitation is prescribed by statute." 
2
 Statutes of limitation "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Becton Dickinson & Co. v. 
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This "interest in finality" applies here because twelve years after exercise, Silver 
Creek emerged and claimed that the Option was still valid. High Valley, believing since 
at least 1991 that the Option was dead (R. 323 ^ 39), restated that belief (Ex. P-18) and 
was forced to file this action to resolve this twelve year old contingency. 
A. Even under Silver Creek's reading of the Option, the statute of limitations 
on a claim for breach began to run as early as December 31, 1987, 
lapsing on or about December 31,1993. 
Generally, a limitations period begins to run "upon the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action." Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 
1981). Then, a plaintiff must file the claim "before the limitations period expires or the 
claim will be barred." Russell-Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 741, 746 (Utah 
2005). "Mere ignorance . . . of a cause of action" neither prevents a statute from running 
nor "excuse[s] a plaintiffs failure to file a [timely] claim." Id., citing Myers, 635 P.2d at 
86. 
An action for breach of contract is ripe, and the statute begins to run, "when the 
breach occurs." Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah App. 1987). This has long 
been the rule. See M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 
998 (1922). 
Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983), quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). 
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According to the Option, or more precisely according to Silver Creek's successful 
interpretation of it, High Valley was to file an application to segregate the 56 acre feet 
and change its point of diversion and assign that water to Silver Creek "[u]pon notice of 
the exercise of the Option and deposit of the cash sums required by the provisions of 
[paragraph C] . . . . " (Ex. P-4 at 7, U C. (3). (See R. 320 % 20, 321 f 23). 
If, therefore, the Option required High Valley to act immediately—"upon notice" 
and the initial deposit under paragraph C.(2)(a)—which is how Silver Creek and the trial 
court read the agreement (R. 320 If 19; R. 346-187, lines 7-8, -15, linesl-3, -19-20, lines 
23-25/1-5)—High Valley breached on or about December 31, 1987, when notice of 
exercise was given and the funds deposited. (R. 320, ]f 17-18). Six years later, in 
December of 1993, Silver Creek had not sued, despite its belief that it "owned" the 56 
acre feet. (R. 346—175, 177). 
Silver Creek cites Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 
1990). Combe observed the truism that a contracting party should not be penalized for 
encouraging performance by a breaching party. Id. at 725. (See App. Brf. at 11). High 
Valley concurs. 
But Combe's observation does not describe this case. Because Silver Creek 
prevailed on its argument that the Option was fully exercise'd on at the end of 1987 (R. 
45805lvl 
-18-
320 If 19; 321 If 23), High Valley's obligations matured then and were due "promptly." 
(R. 322 f 32). 
It was never disputed that Silver Creek "made a further unsatisfied demand" in 
1993. (R. 321 f 28; see also R. 004 | 22 and R. Oil % 22)(emphasis added). That 
demand came five years after exercise. Demands continued throughout 1994. (Exs. P-14 
through P-17). Surely, "promptly" came and went before 1994, and several years before 
1999, which is when Silver Creek claims the statute began to run. (App. Brf. at 
1 l)(Silver Creek "continued to expect performance . . . until at least 1999"). 
If, as Silver Creek argued, performance was due upon exercise, which Silver 
Creek claimed and the trial court found happened the last day of 1987, then breach 
occurred in 1988, when High Valley failed to perform. It certainly occurred when High 
Valley refused demand, either in 1993 or 1994. (R. 321128; R. 322 ffi[ 33-34; (Ex. P-17). 
Upland Industries v. Pacific Gamble Robinson, 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984)(breach of 
contract occurred when time for performance arrived and party refused to perform). 
B. The trial court found correctly that the statute of limitations began to run 
no later than March 28, 1994, when High Valley again repudiated any 
obligation under the Option. 
A claim is generally actionable—it accrues—when "it becomes remediable in the 
courts, that is when the claim is in such condition that the courts can proceed and give 
judgment if the claim is established." State Tax Commrn v. Spanish Fork, 100 P.2d 575, 
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577 (1940). See also Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275 | 15 (Utah 2001)("In most 
circumstances, a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary 
to complete the cause of action.")(internal quotation and citation omitted); State v. 
Huntington ClevelandIrrig. Co., 52 P.3d 1257, 1264 (Utah 2002). 
Repudiation is an actionable breach. Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah 
1967)("Repudiation is the refusal to perform a duty or obligation owed to the other 
party"); Petersen v. Intermountain Captial Corp., 508 P.2d 536 (Utah 1973). "A party's 
refusal to perform under the terms of an agreement constitutes a breach of that 
agreement." Cobabe v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1992), citing inter alia Kasco 
Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992).3 
"[T]o constitute a repudiation, a party's language must be sufficiently positive to 
be reasonably interpreted to mean that the party will not . . . perform. . . ." Scott v. 
Majors, 980 P.2d 214, 218 f 18 (Utah App. 1999), quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 250 cmt. b (1981)(emphasis in Scott). 
In Upland Industries, for example, the parties agreed to a lease that included 
certain extension provisions and an option to purchase. The parties disputed whether the 
3
 See also Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 2000)(statute of limitations on 
claim by beneficiary against trustee begins to run when beneficiary "knows or through 
reasonable investigation could have learned of a breach or repudiation"); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §70A-2a-402("Anticipatory repudiation"); §70A-2a-529("Lessor's damages for 
lessee's default"); §70A-2a-523("Lessor's remedies"); §70A-2a-403("Retraction of 
anticipatory repudiation"). 
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lessee had extended and exercised the purchase option properly. 684 P.2d at 640. Lessor 
had notified lessee that a purported extension of the lease was ineffective and that the 
tenancy had converted to a mere hold-over, thus nullifying the option. Id. at 642. 
In the ensuing litigation, the lessee counterclaimed seeking to enforce the option. 
Lessor argued that the counterclaim was time-barred because the statute of limitations 
began when lessor claimed that the tenancy was a hold-over. Observing that the claim 
accrues upon breach, id. at 643, the court held that breach occurred when lessor "actually 
refused to convey the property . . . as required under the purchase option . . . . " Id. 
Matters in this case reached critical mass in March of 1994. After repeated, 
unsatisfied demands by Silver Creek, the parties convened an all-hands meeting in 
March, 1994. (R. 322 f 33). There, the two sides staked out unmistakable, unmovable 
and diametrically opposed positions concerning the Option: 
Cary Jones [counsel for Silver Creek] made it real clear that—that his client 
wanted the water, wanted that right transferred to him. 
Bill Geisdorf [then president of High Valley] made it real clear that that 
was not going to happen. 
(R. 346—56). 
Moments later, the trial judge got to the heart of the matter: 
THE COURT: Here's what I'm trying to get. . . .by the time this meeting 
took place . . . was there a position being staked out by High Valley that the 
[0]ption was not valid, regardless of whether notice had been given? 
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THE WITNESS: Yes. Definitely. 
Id. at 57.4 
This undisputed evidence, and more, resulted in the unchallenged finding that, 
"High Valley's position as expressed at the meeting amounted to an absolute repudiation 
of any obligation to perform." (R. 322, ^ 34). Based on the trial court's finding that the 
Option had been exercised properly, this repudiation was a breach the moment it 
occurred. (R. 323-24, Tflf 1-3). That breached triggered the limitations period. Silver 
Creek, then fully aware of its rights, failed to act. Id. ^ 4.5 
II. SILVER CREEK FAILS TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF, OR 
EVEN TO CHALLENGE, THE COURT'S FINDING THAT SILVER CREEK KNEW 
OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN IT HAD A CLAIM AS OF MARCH, 1994. 
The only way to challenge a finding of fact is to first marshal the evidence 
supporting that finding and then explain why the evidence is insufficient. In other words, 
4
 The witness further described the March, 1994 meeting: "[t]hey were at polar extremes 
on this issue. Cary Jones [counsel for Silver Creek] would accept nothing less than the 
56 acre-feet of water right[,] and Bill Giesdorf [then president of High Valley] . . . was 
not willing to give him one acre-foot...." (R. 346—56-57). 
5
 Silver Creek had made several unsatisfied demands that High Valley perform under the 
Option. (R. 322 fflf 31-33; 323 f 36; 321 f 28; Exs. P-14 through P-17; R. 321 f30; 322 f 
33; 323 <|[ 36). High Valley's March, 1994 position on the matter was certainly not new. 
(Exs. P-12 at 2; P-23 at 3 § VII(a); P-24 and 25). Others involved in the transaction had 
made the same observation. (Ex. P-33 at 2)(Silver Creek "does not yet have title and will 
not until it performs certain additional conditions precedent in its option to purchase 
agreement. These include the payment of additional funds . . . " ) . 
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Silver Creek has, first, the unhappy task of cataloguing "every scrap" of evidence against 
it. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
"After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, [Silver Creek] 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. That flaw must be serous enough to 
"convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous." Id. See also Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 94 P3d 193, 203 (Utah 
2004)(after marshaling, the appellant must "demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.") 
Trial judges deserve this deference "because they are in an advantaged position to 
evaluate the evidence and determine the facts." State v. Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108 (Utah 
2000). Informing those findings, of course, and expressly recognized by rule 52, is the 
trial court's own "consideration of the believability of the witnesses' testimony." 
McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Utah 1981). 
Nowhere does Silver Creek attempt to marshal and then attack the trial court's 
findings. Indeed, Silver Creek does not identify as an appeal issue the "subsidiary" 
factual finding that it knew, or should have known, that it had a claim in March of 1994. 
This omission is fatal. 
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III. SILVER CREEK MISAPPLIES THE LAW CONCERNING EXECUTORY 
CONTRACTS. 
"[A]nticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests a 
positive and unequivocal intent not to render its promised performance." Cobabe, 844.2d 
at 303(emphasis added). It is, in other words, a threat not to perform in the future, before 
performance is actually due. Upland Indus., 684 P.2d at 643(anticipatory breach is 
committed "before the time has come when there is a present duty of performance, and is 
the outcome of words or acts evincing an intention to refuse performance in the 
future ")(emphasis added)(quotations and citation omitted). 
Relying on this concept—where performance is pending but not due—Silver 
Creek argues that the Option "remains" (apparently to this day) "executory . . . awaiting 
full performance by the parties." (App. Brf. at 7). Silver Creek contends that High 
Valley's conduct so far is merely "delayed performance." (App. Br. At 7). 
This is appeal by euphemism. The trial court found, and Silver Creek has not 
adequately challenged it, that High Valley unequivocally repudiated. (R. 322, fflf 33-36). 
Merely giving a new, more favorable label to conduct already characterised by the trial 
court is no substitute for a proper challenge to the findings. 
Silver Creek prevailed in its argument that the Option was properly and fully 
exercised in 1987. (R. 3211fl[ 19, 23, 30, 31). The Option provides that "upon" exercise, 
High Valley was to perform. (R. 319-20, | 15; Ex. P-4 at 6). There is nothing executory 
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about High Valley's obligation. It was under Silver Creek's interpretation due on 
December 31, 1987. The only interruption was the temporary change, which expired on 
July 15, 1989. (R. 321 If 26). 
At best, therefore, with the approved temporary change in place, High Valley's 
performance was "executory" during that period, and became due the day the temporary 
change expired. But here, Silver Creek proves too much. Even if High Valley's 
performance remained executory after the temporary change lapsed, that performance 
was due—-because the Option had been exercised—the moment Silver Creek demanded 
it. 
The trial court agreed. Silver Creek demanded performance at the March, 1994, 
meeting: "It was made clear at this meeting that Silver Creek believed it was then 
entitled to the transfer of the 56 acre feet and the filing of the permanent change 
application." (R. 322 If 34)(emphasis added). High Valley refused, disclaiming any 
obligation. Id. 
"An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests a 
positive and unequivocal intent to not render its promised performance when the time 
fixed for it in the contract arrives." Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 724 
(UtahApp. 1990). 
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So even if the Option is deemed "executory," and High Valley's breach merely 
"anticipatory" until performance was due, the time for performing "arrive[d]"—again, 
because the Option had been fully exercised (R. 320 f^ 19)—when Silver Creek began 
issuing demands, the earliest of which was at least in 1993 (R. 321 f^ 28). Those demands 
or claims continued through November of 1994. (R. 323 | 36; Exs. P-16, P-17). But the 
meeting in March of 1994, the facts of which remain unchallenged, was without question 
the moment of truth for both parties. Silver Creek demanded performance, High Valley, 
believing the Option unenforceable, refused. (R. 322 fflf 33-35).6 
Spears v. Warr illustrates Silver Creek's error. There, buyers alleged that an 
agreement to purchase lots included irrigation rights as part of the price. Sellers claimed 
that the irrigation rights were to be transferred later, under separate deeds and after 
additional payment. 44 P.3d at 745-47. Sellers argued among other things that buyers' 
claims for breach were time-barred. Id, at 753. 
High Valley's belief that the Option was never properly exercised was not without a 
sound basis. The Option requires the deposit of a sum certain ($24,371), interest on that 
amount, plus payment for water service of $1,400 per month until closing. (P-4 at 6-7, ffif 
C.(2)(b)(c) and 3.D.). Silver Creek admitted that it made only the initial deposit, and to 
this day never paid for the water service. (R. 346—172-3, 176). The trial court ruled 
nevertheless that the Option was exercised properly and that the other sums (interest and 
water service payments) were intended to accrue until closing. (R. 320-21 f 22). That 
interpretation means that High Valley agreed to carry the Atkinson water service for 
(according to Silver Creek's reading of the Option) an indeterminate period, until Silver 
Creek decided it actually wanted the water it "always" believed it "owned." (R. 346-
177). Of course, getting paid for water service was a primary purpose of the 1987 
Agreement in the first place. (R. 319 fflf 12-13, 15.a.3.). 
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The court observed that the statute of limitations begins to run "upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Id. That event, 
said the court, was when sellers stated that the water would be delivered only after 
additional payment. Id. at 754. "Thus, the plaintiffs knew or should have known that 
[sellers] were not going to deliver the irrigation water rights as promised, thereby 
breaching the agreement." Id. 
The essential facts in Spears and this case are the same. In both cases, a party 
believed that performance of a contract was due. In both cases, the party owing that 
performance stated that it would not perform. In Spears, that refusal to perform was a 
breach, triggering the statute of limitations. Id. Applying that same reasoning, the trial 
court here found that the same refusal also triggered the limitations period. (R. 322 Tf 33-
35). 
High Valley's performance was not contingent on State Engineer approval of 
the anticipated change application. 
Silver Creek argues that the Option can "only close [sic] when there is a final 
[State Engineer] approval of the change application" High Valley was to file. (App. Brf. 
at 8). This is incorrect. The Option, according to High Valley's own argument at trial, 
was fully ripe, and High Valley's performance was due, as of December 31, 1987. (R. 
321 f 23), The trial court agreed. (R. 321 flf 29-30). 
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At that point, had High Valley filed the change application and transferred the 
water, the contract would have been complete as far as High Valley's obligations were 
concerned. The only contingency—outside the control of either party—was whether the 
State Engineer would approve the application. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-
8(containing requirements for State Engineer approval). 
If not, then the parties simply reverted to their pre-contract positions. (Ex. P-4 at 
7). But in no event did High Valley owe any further performance. High Valley's 
obligations ripened in 1987 and, once completed, ended its contract duties. This 
performance was required before the State Engineer could act. 
Therefore, the outcome of the change application process was not the decisive 
factor by which to measure High Valley's performance or to determine whether the 
Option was "executory."8 
The Option provides that in the event of State Engineer denial, "then upon issuance of 
the final order of denial all amounts on deposit . . . shall be disbursed to [Silver Creek] 
whereupon all rights and obligations pursuant to this paragraph 3C shall terminate and be 
of no further force or effect." (Ex. P-4 at 7). 
8
 Typically, when performance is pending but the time has not yet arrived and there has 
been an anticipatory repudiation, "three options are available to the non-breaching party: 
1. Treat the entire contract as broken and sue for damages. 
2. Treat the contract as still binding and wait until the time arrive[s] for its performance 
and at such time bring an action on the contract. 
3. Rescind the contract and sue for money paid or for the value of the services or 
property furnished. 
Cobabe, 844 P.2d at 303, n.18, quotingHurwitz v. DavidK. Richards Co., 436 P.2d 794, 
796(Utahl968). 
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This was not a case where the time for performance had not yet arrived and High 
Valley was merely threatening breach. The Option was exercised (R. 3 2 1 1 | 23, 30, 31), 
meaning that a contract was formed. SLW/Utah v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 
1998). Silver Creek was as a result entitled to performance on demand. High Valley 
breached when demand was refused.9 
IV. SILVER CREEK WAS OBLIGATED TO ACT TO ENFORCE ITS RIGHTS UNDER 
THE OPTION WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER EXERCISE OF THE 
OPTION. 
Even if Silver Creek had some unstated discretion to wait before demanding High 
Valley's performance, that discretion was not indefinite. "[W]hen a provision in a 
contract requires an act to be performed without specifying the time, the law implies that 
it is to be done within a reasonable time under the circumstances; and in case of 
controversy, that is something for the trial court to determine." Bradford v. Alvey & 
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240,1242 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, however, even under the reading urged by Silver Creek, the time for 
performing arrived when demand was made, in 1993 (R. 321128), and several times in 
1994 (R. 323 f 36), because Silver Creek had properly exercised the Option. (R. 320 f 
19). 
9
 Time and again High Valley repeated its position. (R. 322 f 33)("Silver Creek . . . had 
made previous demands or requests that High Valley file the change application and 
transfer the 56 acre feet, and High Valley had consistently refused."). See also R. 323 ^ 
36("Letters exchanged prior to the meeting between attorneys for High Valley and Silver 
Creek establish that High Valley had taken the position that Silver Creek was not entitled 
to the 56 acre feet."). 
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Frederickson v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983), is instructive. 
There, plaintiffs contract required that profits from the sale of land be paid to plaintiff, or 
in the alternative plaintiff had the option to select certain parcels in lieu of payment. 
Portions of the land were sold at different times. No profits were paid to plaintiff; neither 
did he ever exercise the option to take land. Receiving neither money nor land, plaintiff 
sued for breach eight years after the last parcel was sold. 
Applying the six year limitations period, the trial court ruled, and our Supreme 
Court affirmed, that the statute began to run upon the sale of the last parcel, which was 
the last trigger for the profit payments and which also ended the option to take land in 
lieu of cash. Plaintiff argued that the statute could not begin until after he made formal 
demand concerning the option. Id. 37-38. 
The court disagreed: 
Where a demand is necessary to start a limitation period running, a party is not 
permitted to postpone indefinitely or unreasonably, by failing to make demand, the 
time when the statute will begin to run, for by his laches he may be deemed to 
have perfected his right of action so as to start the running of the statute although 
he never actually made demand. Unless a delay in making a demand is expressly 
contemplated by the parties, the courts may presume from the lapse of an 
unreasonable time that a demand was made and refused. 
Id. at 38 (citation omitted). 
Here, of course, a presumption is unnecessary. Silver Creek actually made a 
demand . . . several times. "All that is required [to trigger the statute of limitations] is . . . 
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sufficient information" to put a plaintiff "on notice" that it may have a claim. Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996)(citations omitted). 
What put Silver Creek on notice, or should have, were High Valley's consistent, 
unambiguous refusals in response to persistent, unambiguous demands. And it is 
disingenuous for Silver Creek to claim that High Valley merely "delayed" its 
performance or that it seeks to use that delay "as a basis to excuse its obligation . . . ." 
(App. Brf. at 9 and n. 2). 
By 1993, when Silver Creek demanded performance, High Valley had already 
acted on its belief that the Option was never properly exercised. It had in 1991 (3V£ years 
after Silver Creek exercised and two years after the temporary change lapsed) dedicated 
its water to its large distribution project. (R. 323 f 39; 318 fflf 8-9). High Valley did not 
delay anything. It believed that the Option was dead. Silver Creek's still unexplained 
silence between 1988 and 1993 gave High Valley no reason to think otherwise. 
If, on the other hand, High Valley had some right to delay its own performance, 
the result is the same. The trial court found that Silver Creek exercised the Option 
properly. (R. 320 Tf 19). The duty to perform then shifted to High Valley. (R. 321 f 23). 
Ignoring for the moment (1) the unchallenged finding that High Valley was to act 
"promptly" and (2) the Option's requirement that High Valley perform "upon" exercise, 
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High Valley was still required to act "within a reasonable time under the circumstances . . 
. ." Bradford, 621 P.2d at 1242. 
Surely five years, from the end of 1987 when the Option was exercised, to the end 
of 1993, after Silver Creek's demand, is "reasonable" under these circumstances. That 
was just the first five years of what Silver Creek seems to believe is a perpetually 
executory contract. More unsatisfied demands came in 1994. {See Exs. P-17 and P-18). 
A. Silver Creek cannot claim reasonably that it permitted High Valley to 
"use" the water. 
Silver Creek also contends that its inaction is excused and the limitations period 
delayed practically indefinitely because it "allowed" High Valley to "use" the water as 
some sort of kind "gesture." (App. Brf. at 11-12). First, there is absolutely no finding to 
support this claim. Second, the claim is risible in light of Silver Creek's "serial demands 
for performance" during 1993 and 1994. (R. 321 \ 30; 322 % 33). 
Silver Creek cannot have this issue both ways. Either it demanded the water 
(regardless of whether it "needed" it) or it did not. The trial court found that it did, 
repeatedly. Silver Creek even believed in 1994 that it had the basis for a "suit to establish 
[its] rights in and to the [water]" (Ex. P-16) and still never acted. That fact alone destroys 
any attempt to overcome the finding that Silver Creek knew it had a claim. 
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Asked about this "gesture," Silver Creek's principal owner could not explain why, 
if Silver Creek was just being kind for a dozen years (1988 through 2000), his attorney 
demanded the water in 1993 and 1994. (R. 346-174-75, lines 20-25, 1-8). 
B. Silver Creek's argument that the statute did not commence until 1999 is 
not supported by the unchallenged facts. 
Finally, Silver Creek argues that the statute of limitations could not have 
j ' 
commenced any sooner than 1999, when it made yet another demand. (App. Brf. at 10; 
See Ex. P-29). Silver Creek contends that "[t]he earliest [it] could reasonably be deemed 
to have demanded performance is May 13, 1999, when counsel for [Silver Creek] sent a 
letter to High Valley (App. Brf. at 10). 
As remarkable as that claim is in light of the numerous clear and undisputed 
demands five and six years earlier (R. 321 f 30), Silver Creek proposes this even more 
remarkable conclusion: 
It was not until this point in time that High Valley, in response to [Silver Creek's] 
inquiry, made clear that it did not intend to file the required applications with the 
State Engineer and declined to assign the Water Right to [Silver Creek]." 
(App. Brf. at 10). 
According to Silver Creek, therefore, the statute could not commence until it got 
serious about its contract rights. It was serious when it issued written demands by its 
lawyers. Only after High Valley "made it clear" it would not perform does the statute 
commence. Id. First, Silver Creek seems unaware that this statement is a direct but 
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insufficient assault on the findings of fact that the 1994 demands and refusals triggered 
the statute. 
Oddly enough, however, the trial court actually agreed with the substance of Silver 
Creek's argument. Lawyer-issued demands indeed are operative facts in this case. 
Referring to the March, 1994 meeting, the trial court used strikingly similar language to 
explain how those facts operate: 
It was made clear at this meeting [among the attorneys] that Silver Creek believed 
it was then entitled to the transfer of the 56 acre feet and the filing of the 
permanent change application. High Valley made it clear at this meeting that it 
had not transferred the water or filed the permanent change application and that it 
had no intention of doing so. . . . High Valley's position as expressed at the 
meeting amounted to an absolute repudiation of any obligation to perform. 
(R. 322 If 34)(emphasis added). See also id. at ^ 33. 
Silver Creek apparently expects the Court to find some meaningful distinction 
between the May, 1999 demand by counsel (Ex. P-29) and the 1994 demands, also by 
counsel. (Exs. P-15, 16 and 17, plus the oral demand at the March, 1994 meeting). 
Silver Creek still must overcome High Valley's unequivocal 1994 commentary on 
the Option when Silver Creek's attorneys issued one such demand: 
It is apparent High Valley's position needs clarification. The option to purchase 
the 56 acre-feet of water was not exercised as contemplated by the agreement and 
is no longer valid. The purpose of my letter was to resolve any claim to the 
escrow funds - not to revive the option. 
(Ex.P-14). 
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There is no mistaking the meaning of this statement, and no excuse for failing to 
V. SILVER CREEK IS ESTOPPED BY ITS OWN INACTION FROM CLAIMING ANY 
RIGHTS UNDER THE OPTION. 
This Court may affirm for any reason. Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Utah 
2002). The trial court did not rely on estoppel as a basis for invalidating the Option, but 
this Court may.10 Ordinarily, equity is not available when there is "an adequate remedy 
at law." Utco Assoc, v. Zimmerman, 27 P.3d 177, 180 (Utah App. 2001). Accordingly, 
the legal remedy based on the statute of limitations is the remedy of first resort. If that is 
unavailable, the court may look to equity. 
The unchallenged facts of this case fit squarely within the doctrine of estoppel. Its 
elements are: 
(i)[A] statement, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on 
the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) 
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, act, or failure to act. 
Ceco Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted). 
Because Silver Creek had not paid the water service portion of the option price (R. 
320 t1f 18, 22; (R. 346—172-3, 176), High Valley believed the Option had not been 
High Valley argued estoppel in its motion for summary judgment and at trial. (R. 
040; R. 279). 
45805 lvl QC 
exercised. Hearing nothing from Silver Creek, High Valley proceeded in 1991 with a 
large water project that included the 56 acre feet. (Exs. P-22, P-24, P-25; R. 318 ffif 8-10; 
323 U 39). 
Silver Creek knew about High Valley's advertised Exchange Application (P-22) 
(See R. 346-173) and still did nothing. "Silence, when conscience requires one to speak," 
is a basis for estoppel. Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 98 P.2d 695 (Utah 1940). 
The Weber River Basin is closed to further appropriation and transfers. (R. 323 ^ 
40). The water is all but irreplaceable. (R. 346—73, 75-76). And during the years 
between 1988 and 2000, when it filed this action to resolve this lingering issue, as might 
be expected after a dozen years, High Valley has come to rely on that water. (R. 323 ^ 
39). 
Silver Creek's failure to marshal even a single fact in support of the trial court's 
findings ends this appeal. But Silver Creek also misapplies the law. Even if the Option 
was executory for some period, performance was due, and the limitations period 
commenced, the moment demand was made. Silver Creek believed it had the basis for a 
claim—a fact it cannot challenge (See Ex. P-16). Its 1999 demand did not restart a 
limitations statute that had by that time been running for five years. 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm. 
August ( 7 » 200! Respectfully submitted, 
MABEY & WRIGHT, LLC 
David C. Wright 
Attorneys for Appellee High Valley Water 
Company 
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ADDENDUM 
David C. Wright - 5566 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3663 
Fax:(801)359-2320 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
High Valley Water Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Silver Creek Investors, 
Defendant. 
This action was tried to the bench on December 8, 2004. Plaintiff was represented by 
David C. Wright, of Mabey & Wright. Defendant was represented by Edwin C. Barnes, of 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson. Having considered the testimonial, documentary and other 
evidence and the arguments of counsel, and consistent with the court's oral ruling from the bench 
on December 8, 2004, the Court hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Judge Deno G. Himonas 
A 2 / / . 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue: 
1. Plaintiff, High Valley Water Company ("High Valley"), is a private, non-profit 
mutual water company formed pursuant to the laws of the state of Utah for the purpose of 
providing water service to its shareholders. 
2. Defendant, Silver Creek Investors ("Silver Creek"), is a Utah general partnership. 
Robert Larsen is and always has been the eighty-five percent owner and general partner of Silver 
Creek. 
3. Jurisdiction in this court is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4. 
4. Venue in this county is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-13-4. 
High Valley's Water Rights 
5. High Valley is entitled to the use of a total of 287 acre feet of water pursuant to 
two contracts with Weber Basin Water Conservancy District ("Weber Basin"). The first contract 
is for 285 acre feet and is dated February 28, 1974, contract no. 29505 ("the 1974 Contract"). 
The second contract is for 2 acre feet and is dated October 18, 1977, contract no. 7414. 
6. High Valley obtained rights under the 1974 Contract for 285 acre feet pursuant to 
an Assignment from its predecessor, Crossroads Water Company on February 28, 1974. 
7. High Valley is assessed a yearly charge for water under both Weber Basin 
contracts. In 2003, for water service in 2004, High Valley paid a total of $12,394.55. High 
Valley has paid each of its yearly assessments since first acquiring those contract rights. 
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8. On June 14, 1991, High Valley filed Exchange Application E2846 "Exchange 
Application") with the Utah State Engineer. The Exchange Application was advertised as 
required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-6. On April 13, 1992, the Utah State Engineer approved 
the Exchange Application, permitting the exchange of the 285 acre feet represented by the 1974 
Contract. The purpose of the exchange was to allow High Valley to interconnect its system with 
Atkinson Special Service District and Park Ridge Estates. 
9. The approved Exchange Application was filed with the Utah State Engineer 
pursuant to and in anticipation of two contracts with Atkinson Special Service District and Park 
Ridge Estates. The first of these contracts is titled "Agreement to Jointly Construct a Water 
Well, Reservoir and Water Distribution Pipelines" and is dated July 23, 1991. The second 
contract is titled "Agreement to Jointly Use, Operate, and Maintain a Water Well, Reservoir, 
Water Distribution Pipelines and Related Facilities," also dated July 23, 1991. 
10. Construction under the agreements was completed, and those operations continue 
today. 
Creation of the 1987 Option 
11. Historically, Atkinson Water Company ("AWC"), a private water company, was a 
customer and shareholder of High Valley. Over time, certain disputes arose between High 
Valley and AWC concerning delivery to AWC's shareholders. 
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12. As a result of these disputes, AWC accumulated debt to High Valley for water 
service. 
13. On August 20, 1987, to address these disputes, High Valley, AWC, Atkinson 
Special Service District and Summit County-Atkinson Water Improvement District entered into 
an agreement (the "1987 Agreement"). The 1987 Agreement specified the amount owed to High 
Valley by AWC and provided for payment of that amount. 
14. The 1987 Agreement included an option allowing AWC to purchase 56 acre-feet 
of water from High Valley, and specifically 56 acre feet from the 1974 Contract (the "Option"). 
15. The Option provides as follows with respect to its proper exercise: 
a. written notice of exercise, delivered no later than December 31, 1987, 
1 an initial deposit of $24,371.64, 
2. payments in an amount equal to 10% per year on the initial deposit, from 
July 31, 1987, to the date of closing of the purchase, and 
3. payment of any unpaid balance owed to High Valley for water service to 
AWC as described in paragraph 3D of the 1987 Agreement from August 1, 1987, to the 
date of closing of the purchase. 
b. Exercise of the Option required that the purchase price be deposited at Silver 
King Bank (now Bank One). 
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c. High Valley was obligated to file an application with the Utah State Engineer for 
segregation and change in the point of diversion of 56 acre-feet, together with an assignment of 
that water to the owner of the Option, upon notice of the exercise of the Option and deposit of 
the sums required. 
Exercise of the Option 
16. On December 1, 1987, AWC assigned the Option to Silver Creek. 
17. AWC gave timely notice of the exercise of the Option on December 31, 1987, on 
behalf of Silver Creek. 
18. Silver Creek deposited $24,371.64 in Silver King State Bank 
19. Silver Creek's conduct in providing timely and proper written notice of exercise 
of the Option and the timely deposit of the funds just described constituted full performance of 
its obligations under the Option. 
20. After providing written notice of exercise and making the deposit described 
above, Silver Creek took certain actions consistent with its claim of ownership, including 
pledging the 56 acre feet as security for a loan. 
21. The amount deposited by Silver Creek, with accrued interest, remains at Bank 
One (formerly Silver King). 
22. The remaining balance of the purchase price under the Option was to accrue until 
the closing date, at which time Silver Creek and High Valley were to calculate the interest due 
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and owing under part b. of the Option price and to calculate the amount due and owing for water 
service under part c. of the Option. Any additional amount of accrued interest and water service 
fees under paragraph 3D of the 1987 Agreement was to be paid at closing. 
23. Silver Creek's written notice of exercise and deposit of $24,371.64 gave rise to 
High Valley's obligation to file the permanent change application to segregate the 56 acre feet 
and otherwise begin the process of transferring the 56 acre feet to Silver Creek. 
24. Silver Creek, through its attorney Lee Kapoloski, filed an Application for 
Temporary Change of Water, no. 88-35-4 (the "Temporary Application"), on June 30, 1988. 
25. The Temporary Application was approved on July 7, 1988. 
26. The Temporary Application expired of its own terms on July 15, 1989. 
27. Silver Creek knew that the Temporary Application expired on July 15, 1989. 
28. In 1993, Silver Creek made a further unsatisfied demand that the 56 acre feet of 
water be segregated and conveyed to Silver Creek. 
29. High Valley did not file the permanent change application as required by the 
Option, did not take action to segregate the 56 acre feet or otherwise begin the process of 
transferring the 56 acre feet to Silver Creek. 
30. High Valley initially but incorrectly believed that the Option had not been 
exercised as contemplated by its terms and, notwithstanding serial demands for performance by 
Silver Creek, declined to segregate and convey the 56 acre feet of water. 
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31. High Valley's failure to file the permanent change application and perform the 
other terms of the Option constituted a breach of the Option. 
32. Although there is some dispute about when High Valley's breach occurred, it was 
High Valley's obligation to file its application with the State Engineer upon notice of the 
exercise of the Option. That did not occur, either upon receipt of the notice or thereafter. The 
Court does not make a specific finding of when High Valley's breach occurred but notes that 
High Valley had the obligation to proceed promptly upon exercise of the Option. 
33. The (then) attorneys for High Valley, Marc Wangsgard, and Silver Creek, Cary 
Jones, met approximately one week prior to March 28, 1994, to discuss their respective positions 
concerning the Option. This meeting occurred after the exchange of several letters in 1994 
concerning performance of the Option. Silver Creek, through Mr. Jones, had made previous 
demands or requests that High Valley file the change application and transfer the 56 acre feet, 
and High Valley had consistently refused. 
34. It was made clear at this meeting that Silver Creek believed it was then entitled to 
the transfer of the 56 acre feet and the filing of the permanent change application. High Valley 
made it clear at this meeting that it had not transferred the water or filed the permanent change 
application and that it had no intention of doing so. To the extent its previous conduct may not 
have done so, High Valley's position as expressed at the meeting amounted to an absolute 
repudiation of any obligation to perform. 
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35. Under any reasonable process contemplated by the Option, High Valley should 
have filed the change application before the meeting held a week before March 28, 1994. 
36. Letters exchanged prior to the meeting between attorneys for High Valley and 
Silver Creek establish that High Valley had taken the position that Silver Creek was not entitled 
to the 56 acre feet. 
37. The six year statute of limitations on a claim against High Valley for breach of the 
Option began to run upon breach, but in any event no later than March 28, 1994. 
38. Silver Creek failed to file an action for breach or to enforce the Option within six 
years of High Valley's breach whenever it ocurred. 
39. Since 1989, High Valley has come to rely on the 56 acre-feet of water in planning 
for its shareholders, including as early as 1991 when it filed the Exchange Application and then 
in 1992 entered into the agreements with Park Ridge and Atkinson. 
40. The Weber River Basin is closed to new appropriations of water. No water rights 
can be transferred into the basin. 
41. Since before and after the Option was created, High Valley has made all payments 
under its contract with Weber Basin, payments that total approximately $11,000 to $12,000 per 
year for the last several years. High Valley has been and remains current in those payments. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A breach of contract occurs when one party, without justification, fails to perform 
a material term of the contract. Ordinarily, a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the 
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last event necessary to complete the cause of action. The breach itself is the last event necessary 
for a breach of contract claim. 
2. High Valley breached the Option when it failed to perform its obligations as 
required upon exercise of the Option or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
3. A claim against High Valley for breach of the Option is governed by the six year 
statute of limitations in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-23(2), requiring that an action be brought 
within six years of the breach. That six year statute of limitations began to run upon High 
Valley's breach and clearly no later than High Valley's repudiation of any intention to perform. 
4. Silver Creek failed to file an action within six years of knowing that it had or 
might have a cause of action against High Valley after High Valley absolutely repudiated any 
obligation under the Option. 
5. Accordingly, High Valley is entitled to this court's declaration, and the court 
hereby declares, that the 1987 Agreement, and specifically the Option, though properly 
exercised, is no longer enforceable, that Silver Creek no longer has a right to obtain performance 
under the 1987 Agreement, and the Option specifically, and that High Valley remains the owner 
of the 56 acre feet. By virtue of the statute of limitations, High Valley is under no obligation, 
legal or equitable, to transfer the 56 acre feet. 
G , ^ Silver Creek is entitled to return of the funds still held at Bank One, and the Court 
further orders that the deposited funds with accrued interest be returned to Silver Creek. High 
Valley is obligated to cooperate in returning the funds to Silver Creek. 
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^L ^ Although the 1987 Agreement contains an attorney fee provision, neither party is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees under the circumstances of this case. 
% ^ ^  High Valley is the prevailing party and is therefore entitled to its costs as provided 
by rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to be established by a Memorandum of Costs. 
January _^_< 2005. 
Approved as to form: 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Attorney for defendant 
BY THE CIOURT 
LX-
V,*\V 
o»\i,"l!!'J,'z. 
Deno G. Himonas" 
District Court Judge 
'"iim^wv^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on January ' \ 2005, a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was delivered to the following by: 
[X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage-prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions 
& Swenson 
201 South Main, #1300 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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F I L E D 
D ^ N 2 5 2005 \ 
By _ •• ourt 
David C. Wright - 5566 
MABEY & WRIGHT, LLC 
265 East 100 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3663 
Fax: (801) 359-2320 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
High Valley Water Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Silver Creek Investors, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
OI osooab M 
Civil No. O40500463 
Judge Deno G. Himonas 
This action was tried to the bench on December 8, 2004. Plaintiff was represented by 
David C. Wright, of Mabey & Wright. Defendant was represented by Edwin C. Barnes, of 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson. Having considered the testimonial, documentary and other 
evidence and the arguments of counsel, and consistent with the court's oral ruling from the bench 
on December 8, 2004, and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that that certain Option for the purchase of 56 acre 
feet from plaintiff, High Valley Water Company ("High Valley"), which was assigned to 
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defendant, Silver Creek Investors ("Silver Creek"), which is contained in that certain agreement 
dated August 20, 1987 (the "1987 Agreement"), by virtue of the statute of limitations, is no 
longer enforceable, that High Valley is under no legal or equitable obligation to transfer the 56 
acre feet to Silver Creek, and that High Valley remains the owner of rights to the 56 acre feet of 
water, pursuant and subject to the terms and conditions of Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District Contract No. 29505 and Exchange No. 1085. 
It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the funds currently on deposit at Bank One, in 
Park City, Utah, in an account under the names of Lee Kapaloski and High Valley, be disbursed 
to Silver Creek. 
It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the parties bear their own attorney fees 
incurred in this action. 
It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that High Valley is entitled to its costs of the 
action pursuant to rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to be established by a 
Memorandum of Cost£, 
2k, January _Z^,2005. 
BY THE COURT 
, t " "n$ri 
DeiiowHimonas 
Distnct Court Judge 
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Approved as to form: 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Attorney for defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on January 2005, a copy of the foregoing Judgment was delivered to 
the following by: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions 
& Swenson 
201 South Main, #1300 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on January / f 2005, a copy of the foregoing Judgment was delivered to 
the following by: 
[X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage-prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions 
& Swenson 
201 South Main, #1300 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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